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"USING GLOBAL LAW TO TEACH
DOMESTIC ADVOCACY"
John B. Mitchell*
I. GLOBAL LAW AND ADVOCACY TRAINING
Among us academics, exploring the integration of a global
perspective into the law school curriculum is considered to be
"fashionable" these days.' It merited an all-day session at the
January, 2006 American Association of Law Schools (AALS)
National Conference,2 appeared among the roster of programs for
AALS 2006 Clinical Conference,3 filled an entire issue of the Journal
of Legal Education,4 and is the subject of a growing body of
* J.D. Stanford Law School, 1970. The author wishes to thank Seattle University
School of Law for a grant supporting this work, Beth Lyons for her invaluable
suggestions, Madeline Kass, and Ron Slye for their assistance, Kelly Kunsch (Hall
of Fame Librarian), and Phyllis Brazier for her word-processing skill.
'Catherine Valcke, Global Law Teaching, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 160, 160 (2004) ("In
North American law schools, going global is fashionable these days."). See also,
John J. Costonis, The LSU Law Center-Canada Bijuralism Conference-
Introduction: Global Law and the Law School Curriculum, 52 J. LEGALEDUC. 1,
1 (2002). ("'Global Law' is becoming as influential an organizing principle for law
teaching and research as trends associated with critical legal studies, feminist and
other forms of outliner jurisprudence, and law and economics and the 'law and'
movement generally"); Adelle Blackett, Globalization and its Ambiguities:
Implications for Law School Curricular Reform, 37 COLuM. J. TRANSACT'L L. 57,
58 (1998) (globalization is the "big" thing).
2 Workshop on Integrating Transnational Legal Perspectives into the First Year
Curriculum at the Ass'n of Am. Law Sch. Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C.
(Jan. 4, 2006) podcast available at www.aals.org/am2006/program/transnationalV
index.html.
3 Making International Cooperation a Two-Way Exchange: Learning With Our
Partners, Plenary Session I - Collaboration in Teaching at Ass'n of Am. Law Sch.
Conference on Clinical Education in New York, N.Y. (Apr. 30, 2006).
4 See, Transnational Articles from the AALS Conference, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 475
et. seq. (2005); This transnational theme continued into the next issue of the
Journal. See, TransnationalArticlesfrom the AALS Conference, 56 J. LEGALEDUC.
161 et. seq. (2006), where the editors promise that "[i]n our next issue you will see
articles suggesting how to teach transactional issues in Civil Procedure, Criminal
Law, Property, and Torts." Id. at 159.
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pedagogical scholarship, as evidenced by this article. It also offers
interesting possibilities for teaching domestic trial advocacy. It is
upon one such possibility that this article focuses: Using foreign law
as a tool for refining students' strategic and performance advocacy
skills.
As yet, there exists no clear, agreed upon definition of what is
meant by "globalization"' let alone any definable body of what can
be termed "global laws."6 Rather, what we have now is a potion,
bubbling and boiling: Add eye of newt, sprinkle with bat wings, mix
in Yen and Euros, slowly add correct proportion foreign law,7
international law,8 comparative law,9 and an ingredient some say does
not yet exist in reality-transnational law (foreign law mixed with
international law)'°-and stir. At some point, when the liquid is
5Blackett, supra note 1, at 60 (discussing the concept of globalization as ambiguous
and that it means different things to different people).6 See, e.g., Satl Litvinoff, Global Law in the Perspectives of the Bijural Curricu-
lum, 52 J. LEGALEDUC. 49,50,52 (2002) (discussing that there is no global law yet
and that if it evolves, it will come out of custom); Valcke, supra note 1, at 163
(discussing that there is no such thing as transnational law, yet).
7See, e.g., Charles R. Stevens, Modern Japanese Law as an Instrument of Compari-
son, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 665 (1971); Jerome Alan Cohen, On Teaching Chinese
Law, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 655 (1971).
'See, e.g., lsaak Dore, The International Law Program at Saint Louis University, 46
J. LEGAL EDUC. 336 (1996) (reflecting on their burgeoning movement towards
appreciating the significance of bodies of law that stand independent from the
domestic law of any particular nation-state). My colleague Ron Slye (with his co-
author Beth Van Schaak) have recently contracted with Aspen Publishers for a book
on International Criminal Law (e.g., Hague and Geneva Conventions, international
tribunals, and such).
9 See, e.g., Michael P. Waxman, Teaching Comparative Law in the 21st Century:
Beyond the Civil/Common Law Dichotomy, 51 J. LEGALEDUC. 305 (2001). But see
Basil Markesinis, Comparative Law: A Subject in Search of an Audience, 53 MOD.
L. REv. 1, 20, 21 (1990) (noting that comparative legal methods came from late
19th Century, where the methods of "legal sciencee" at that time looked at formal
rules, procedures, and institutions, and assumed the primacy of private law). 'Thus,
in a strange sort of way the comparative method may have more of a future by
penetrating other subjects than by trying to assert its own continued existence under
the unconvincing title of comparative law." Id. at 21.
1 See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz et al., Report Regarding the Pacific McGeorge
Workshop on Globalizing the Law School Curriculum, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL
[Vol. 9
HeinOnline  -- 9 T.M. Cooley J. Prac. & Clinical L. 64 2006-2007
2007] USING GLOBAL LAW TO TEACH DOMESTIC ADVOCACY 65
sufficiently reduced, global law will emerge in the residue. While
global law has been much the topic of discussion in the law-school
world, few schools are yet doing more than talking;" although a few
have taken the lead in beginning this alchemy of turning base
domestic legal education into something of substance in the glittering
world of globalization.12
Given the lack of a precise, agreed upon definition of global law,
it should not be surprising that a wide variety of approaches for
implementing the integration of global law into the law school
curriculum have bubbled forth from the cauldron. 3 Thus, as most are
BUSINESS & DEVEL. J. 1, 11-13 (2005) (Students at University of Michigan Law
School must take a "Transnational Law" course - which encompasses any
transaction or dispute that crosses national boundaries.). But see Vacke, supra note
1, at 163 (as yet, there is no such thing as a true body of transnational law; the
issues such a body of law would govern currently are resolved by "appeal to a
combination of international and internal state law.") id. at 163.
" Nora D. Demleitner, A Response to Martha Reimann: More, More, More But
Real Comparative Law, 11 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L. F. 73, 74 (1996) ("Despite the
rhetoric about globalization of law, only a few law schools in the country offer any
international or comparative law training in the first year."). See generally Gevurtz,
supra note 10, at 13-16. Comparatively little has changed since 2005, the
McGeorge report lists very few law schools which are aggressively seeking to
integrate global perspectives into the curriculum.
12 Although, no doubt even as I write, other law schools are joining the endeavor.
See, e.g., John Edward Sexton, The Global Law School Program at New York
University, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 329, 330 (1996) ("[L]aw must be viewed today
through a global lens, and . . . the way we think about and teach law must
incorporate this perspective."); Dore, supra note 8, at 336 (discussing the Global
Law Program at Saint Louis University); Gevurtz, supra note 10, at 13-16
(discussing global law approaches at McGeorge, Michigan and Georgetown). See
also Costonis, supra note 1, at 1, 3 (since LSU and McGill of Canada teach in
bijural jurisdictions, i.e., both civil- and common-law traditions, they use a "trans-
systematic method" in which, e.g., a contracts class looks at a problem such as
enforcement of promises from both civil- and common-law approaches). In fact,
Harvard Law School, as part of "the broadest overhaul [of its first year curriculum]
in more than 100 years," will now require students to take "one of three new courses
dealing with International Law." See, Jonathan D. Glater, Harvard Law Decides to
Steep Students in 21st Century Issues, THE NEW YORK TIMEs, Oct. 7, 2006, at A8.
"This wide array of approaches is in part a reflection of the equally wide range of
rationales supporting this movement. For example, introducing global law into the
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aware, some schools offer comparative law courses, 4 some bring in
foreign scholars1 5 to teach or co-teach classes on foreign law or bring
comparative perspectives into domestic doctrinal courses. Some
schools have conjured International Law 16 and Comparative Legal
Culture 7 courses, while others see in the rising steam from the
cauldron a unifying Institute on Globalization," or a mandate to send
curriculum: prepares students to work with foreign attorneys and foreign clients,
see, e.g., Cohen, supra note 7, at 655; Gevurtz, supra note 10, at 9, prepares
students to face increasingly convergent legal systems, and to become aware that
many of their transactions will involve multiple bodies of domestic, foreign, and
international law, see, e.g., Peter Goldsmith, Globalization: The European
Experience, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 317, 318-20 (1996); Roberta Cooper Ramo, A
Practitioner Looks at Globalization: 1, 46 J. LEGALEDUC. 313, 314 (1996), instills
the ability to "think like" a global lawyer, see, e.g., Valcke, supra note 1, at 161,
provides a perspective from which to teach our own law, revealing avenues of
possible reform, see, e.g., John Edward Sexton, supra note 12, at 330; see, e.g.,
Mathias Reimann, Stepping Out of the European Shadow: Why Comparative Law
in the United States Must Develop Its Own Agenda, 46 AM. J. COMP. L., 637, 645
(1998), and increases our capacity of tolerance of others while, at the same time,
forcing us to respect the other's "difference," Vivian Grosswald Curran, Dealing
in Difference: Comparative Law's Potentialfor Broadening Legal Perspectives, 46
AM. J. COMPAR. L. 657, 657 (1998).
14 Sexton, supra note 13, at 334 (articulating the need for comparative law courses);
Dore, supra note 8, at 338 (explaining that Saint Louis program has curriculum
composed of comparative and international law courses). In fact, my colleague,
Russell Powell, has just created a course entitled "Comparative Law: Middle East"
(syllabus on file with author).
15See, e.g., Sexton, supra note 13, at 333; Norman Dorsen, Achieving International
Cooperation: NYU's Global Law School Program, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 332, 333
(2000) (explaining that every year NYU invites eighteen foreign law teachers to
teach courses and seminars).
16For example, my colleague Ron Slye has developed an International Criminal
Law course (soon to be a book see Slye, supra note 8. See also, JORDAN PAUST ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (Carolina Academic
Press 2000); Dore, supra note 8, at 338. (noting that Saint Louis law school has
several International Law courses as part of their program).
7 Waxman, supra note 9, at 306 (Law in Comparative culture takes problems and
studies the approaches of select legal systems traditions), and considers law as
written, law as implemented, and law within the particular cultural context, see
Waxman, supra note 9, at 308-10.
8See, e.g., Seattle University School of Law recently established an International
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their students to law clinics in foreign countries.' 9 More visionary
still, others propose a pervasive global curriculum, where global
perspectives are integrated into existing domestic doctrinal courses
rather than confined to discrete doctrinal offerings.2 °
While there have been whispers in this global law dialogue
hinting at the possibility of refining our clinical perspective through
a global awareness, 2' virtually all of the curricular discussion (and
and Comparative Law Center. The Center brings in speakers and panels, organizes
overseas programs, encourages and supports International Law scholarship, and
assists faculty who wish to bring a global legal perspective into their traditional
courses. (available at http://www.law.seattleu.edu/international?mode=standard).
"9 See generally, J. P. Ogilvy and Karen Czapansky, Clinical Legal Education: An
Annotated Bibliography (3d ed.), 11 CIUN. L. REv. (Special Issue 2.) 111-411
(2005), detailing the experiences of American students in foreign clinics.
2 See, e.g., Michael P. Waxman, The Comparative Legal Process Throughout the
Law School Curriculum: A Model Proposal for Culture and Competence in a
Pluralistic Society, 74 MARQ. L. REv. 391 (1991) (proposing integrating
comparative law into first-year subjects, and the rest of the curriculum); Mathias
Reimann, The End of Comparative Law as an Autonomous Subject, 11 TUL. EUR.
& Civ. L. F. 49, 50 (1996) (authors proposing integrating comparative law into
other courses) [Hereinafter Comparative Legal Process]; Such an approach has been
apparently successful both in the individual course context. M.C. Mirow,
Globalizing Property: Incorporating Comparative and International Law into First
Year Property Class, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 183 (2004), and at the full institutional
level, Gevurtz, supra note 10, at 2 (McGeorge professors integrate international,
transnational, and comparative law issues into traditional courses; Georgetown
students select from mini-courses with global law perspectives paralleling tradi-
tional first year courses). Cf. Costonis, supra note 1, at 5 (describing bijural educa-
tion at LSU); On the other hand, there certainly have been critics of such a
"pervasive" approach to integrating global law into the curriculum: See, e.g.,
Rudolph B. Schlesinger, The Role of the 'Basic Course' in Teaching of Foreign and
Comparative Law 19 AM. J. COM. L. 616, 616-17 (1971) (stating that it is
unrealistic, and likely misleading, to try to integrate comparative law into traditional
courses).
21 See, e.g., Ruther Buchannan and Sudya Pahuja, Using the Web to Facilitate
Active Learning: A Trans-Pacific Seminar on Globalization and the Law, 53 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 578, 580, 590 (2003) (using "case studies where multiple bodies of
law intersect" students do a role-play exercise where they take the position the of
one of five international organizations); Sexton, supra note 14, at 333-34 (author
posits that students should work in clinics such as those dealing with the U.N. or
transnational commercial issues); Reimann, "Comparative Law", supra note 20, at
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implementation to date) has focused upon doctrinal and
jurisprudential infusions.22 In fact, other than foreign externship
23 2placements, setting up or working in foreign law clinics,24 offering
Human Rights 25 or Immigration Law clinics, 26 or transactional
58 (author discusses an "international legal practice" or "international litigations"
course; courses would not be true comparative law courses, but would necessarily
contain comparative "elements"); Valcke, supra note 1, at 177 (suggests that there
should be clinical aspects to a "global curriculum"); John C. Reitz, How To Do
Comparative Law, 46 AM J. COMP. L. 617, 628-29 (1998) (suggests developing a
course where'students see how attorneys "from inside" different systems use and
argue law).
22 See, e.g., Yves-Marie Morisette, McGill's Integrated Civil and Common-Law
Program, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 12, 20-21 (2002) (lists courses in program, all of
which are doctrinal); See also, International/Global course offerings and summer
abroad programs listed: Georgetown University Law Center, available at http://www.
law.georgetown.edu/oitp/semesterabroad.htm (last visited Fed. 9, 2007); New York
University School of Law, http://www.law.nyu.edu/depts/acservices/registration/
studyabroad.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2007); Pacific McGeorge School of Law,
http://www.mcgeorge.edu/academics/summerschool/index.htm (last visited Feb. 6,
2007); University of Michigan School of Law, http://www.law.umich.edu/CentersAnd
Programs/cicl/programs.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2007); Washington College of Law
American University, http://www.wcl.american.edu/study abroad.cfm (last visited Feb.
9, 2007).
23 See, e.g., University of Michigan School of Law, available at http://www.law.
umich.edu/CentersAndPrograms/cicl/programs.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2007).
24Ogilvy & Czapansky, supra note 19. For example, four Villanova Law students
spent two weeks in the University of Malta refugee clinic, while another student
worked under the supervision of the University of Puerto Rico's Environmental
Law Clinical director last summer. E-mail from Professor Beth Lyon, Villanova
Law School, June 23, 2006 (on file with author).
25E.g., Seattle University School of Law offers a Human Rights Clinic. For a detail
survey by the AALS International Human Rights Section reflecting many of the
Human Rights Programs and Clinics throughout the country's law schools,
available at http://vls.law.vill.edu/clinics/aals/humanrightssurvey.htm See also
Deena Hurwitz, Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of International Human
Rights Clinics, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 505 (2003) and also Arturo Carrillo, Bringing
International Law Home: The Innovative Role Of Human Rights Clinics into the
Transnational Legal Process, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 527 (2004).
2 6See, e.g., Washington College of Law Professor Richard J. Wilson's International
Human Rights Law Clinics (Political Asylum Cases), available at http://www.aals
.org/profdev/humanrights/wilson.htrnl.
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simulations (which I assume someone, somewhere is conducting) in
a discrete set of courses in which multiple bodies of domestic, foreign
and international law play a part,27 there does not appear to be real
hands-on transnational clinical experiences in American classrooms,28
though, that may be about to change.29
The ultimate focus of this article is basic litigation skills training
and with that in mind the creative possibilities are extensive.
Students could argue within the context of other legal systems:3 °
Taking simulation courses in civil law litigation; playing the role of
a defense attorney in a so-called inquisitorial system,3' where the
students try to affect the final outcome of the investigating
27 Such simulation exercises, however, do appear to exist in certain Australian
classrooms, Duncan Bentley & John Wade, Special Methods and Tools for
Educating the Transnational Lawyer, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 479 (2005), and New
Zealand classrooms, Catherine J. Iorns Magallanes, Teaching for Transnational
Lawyering, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 519 (2005).
28While courses on transactional litigation are appearing in law school catalogues,
to date, these are doctrinal courses, which are basically "Global Civil Procedure"
or preparation for international law moot court competitions. See, e.g., International
Civil Litigation at Georgetown University Law Center, available at http://www
.law.georgetown.edu/curriculum/tabcourses.cfm?Status=course&detail=1215, and
international advocacy at University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, available
at http://www.mcgeorge.edu/catalog/media/Course%20Descriptions %20501 .pdf.
29 The Law and Society Association hosted a roundtable on "The Rise of Trans-
national Advocacy Arenas" at its May Conference. The 2007 Clinical Program at
the Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting was entitled "Intro-
ducing International Law, Treaty-Law and other International Law Concepts in
Domestic Cases or Projects-A Teaching Demonstration," available at http://www.
aals.org/am2007/brochure.pdf.
30 See, e.g., Dore, supra note 8, at 337 (author proposes "learning advocacy
techniques under a different but related system.").
31 See, e.g., Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models
and Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506 (1973)
(discussing adversarial and so-called inquisitorial systems.). It has been suggested
that terming the civil law system's criminal procedure as "Inquisitorial" is
misleading, noting that is might be better term "non adversarial." MARY ANN
GLENDON, MICHEAL WALLACE GORDON, CHRISTOPHER OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE
LEGAL TRADITIONS 179 (2d. 1994).
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magistrate's file32 or trying to advocate in a religious33 or customary
law system.
34
It certainly could be interesting. But at this point, my thoughts
about teaching trial skills within the influence of global law are far
less ambitious. I propose taking unique aspects of some foreign legal
system and using these unique aspects (as compared with our system)
as a tool to help the students' domestic advocacy skills. You could
use any foreign legal system, though choosing a fellow common-law
system would probably be easiest given the students' familiarity with
the structure of that system.
In order to fully demonstrate this idea, concreteness seems the
best approach. I have thus created an imaginary class35 for this
article, replete with exercises and accompanying teaching notes. For
this class, I have chosen the Scottish criminal procedure system due
to a variety of interesting systematic differences from our own,
including the "Scotch Verdict,, 36 which I feel are pedagogically
useful.
32 See GLENDON ET AL, supra note 32, at 179, 181 (explaining that this file is an
extensive dossier compiled through investigation and witness interviewing by a
prosecutor or judge. The result of this investigation generally will determine if the
defendant will be charged. "Under modem codes of criminal procedure, the accused
has a right to be represented by counsel during interrogation [and the investigation]
and to remain silent."
33 See, e.g., RUDOLPH B. SCHLESINGER, HANS ETAL., COMPARATIVE LAW, 297,302
(6th ed., 1998) (For Example, in Israel, marriage and divorce are left to the
jurisdiction of Jewish, Moslem, and Christian Religious courts. In Saudi Arabia and
Oman the law's largely based one religious source).
34See, e.g., SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 33, at 303 ("In Indonesia... the Dutch
introduced the so-called 'dualist' system; the majority of the indigenous population
lived under their own customary law (adat) law, varying from region to region.").
351 have never actually taught this class, and now teach other courses than trial
advocacy. But I fully believe it would "work."
36 Criminal juries in Scotland have a choice of three-verdicts; Guilty, Not Guilty,
"Not Proven." See Sam Bray, Not Proven: Introducing a Third Verdict, 72 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1299, 1299 (2005); Joseph M. Barbato, Scotland's Bastard Verdict:
Intermediacy and the Unique Three Verdict System, 15 IND. INT'L& COMP. L. REV.
543 (2005). Peter Duff, The Scottish Criminal Jury: A Very Peculiar Institution:,
62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 193 (Spring 1999).
[Vol. 9
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Though inevitably the students would obtain some of the benefits
said to reside in the integration of global law in the curriculum (e.g.,
gaining a perspective from which to critique our own system, offering
an antidote to American-centered provincialism), that is not my
primary goal. Nor do I intend that the students imagine themselves
to be Scottish lawyers; after all, we all recognize that in order to have
the context needed to carry out such a task, the students would need
to fathom the Scottish culture and character, and the social and
political history of Scotland, as well as the interrelationship between
Scottish law and the culture.37
Again, my incorporation of Scottish criminal procedure into
exercises in an American trial advocacy course is an exercise in
instrumentality. It is intended as a device to enhance the students
domestic advocacy skills by literally changing the rules on them,
thereby forcing them to rethink their strategic litigation approaches
when the range of procedural assumptions underlying their strategies
(e.g., that they will be allowed voir dire, that the verdict must be
unanimous, that they may give an opening statement) abruptly
change.
What follows is a full demonstration of my concept. It includes an
oral "assignment" to the students in a trial advocacy class, and then
"teaching notes" for the exercises that will be the focal point of that
assignment. As you will see when reviewing the teaching notes, in
Part 1, students quickly catalogue the various aspects of the Scotch
criminal procedure system in which that common-law system differs
from our own. In Part 2, going back to the American procedural
system, I put forth a simple robbery case hypothetical, and then set up
a series of questions for a simulation class in which the hypothetical
37 See, e.g., Barbato, supra note 36, at 544 (explaining Scotch law is inextricably
tied to the Scotch heritage and culture); Duff, supra note 36, at 173 ("One of the
benefits of the comparative study of legal institutions is that it exposes the extent
to which they are shaped by contingency as well as by logic or principle."). See
also, Barbato, supra note 36, at 546, (stating that the three verdicts in the Scotch
system are a "product of historical accident.") Cf. Waxman, supra note 21, at 391
(describing that comparative law curriculums include an appreciation of cultural
context).
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is used to help develop the students' strategic and performance
litigation skills.
Finally, Parts 3 and 4 contain mock teaching notes for using the
Scotch criminal justice system within the same hypothetical as in Part
1, again, in order to refine the students' strategic and performance trial
skills.
II. ASSIGNMENT TO CLASS
We're going to be doing a series of exercises in class that are
intended to help you see the relationship between your Case Theory,
the strategic tactics available to successfully present your theory, and
the existing procedural rules. All this will be based on the robbery
hypo38 in your text. Please, know it inside-out. When thinking about
the hypo, imagine that you are representing the defendant. Now, in
our next class, I'm going to ask you to articulate your strategic,
practical, and legal reasons for your choice of Case Theory. So,
again, be prepared. We're then going to look at how you would
approach opening statement, voir dire, and choice of witness(es)
given your Case Theory. All pretty standard stuff; but then we're
going to do something a bit more unusual. We're going to change the
procedural rules, and then have you rethink how you'd carry out or
modify your Case Theory.
What do I mean "change the rules?" We're going to stay in our
basic American legal system, but we're going to borrow a few rules
from a fellow common-law nation: Scotland. Read the Peter Duff
article in your materials. You'll see that even countries with a
common-law system can make different procedural choices than
we've made. For example, there's no voir dire or preemptory
challenges to jurors in the Scottish system. Will that affect your
strategy for persuasively presenting your Case Theory? How? What
will you do?
Now, why are we doing this? Simply to change from the routine
is one possibility, and not necessarily a bad one at that. Admittedly,
this has a certain game-like quality, but in some profound sense, that
3
1 See infra p. 13 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 9
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is the essence of all advocacy. Also, there is something to be said for
learning about other cultures, whether it be art, politics, history or, as
in this case, law. But, I have something more in mind. The proce-
dural rules (in conjunction with Rules of Evidence) set the boundaries
on plausible strategic options for effectuating your Case Theory. By
changing the rules on you, I'm forcing you to be flexible, adaptive,
and creative in your understanding of trial strategy. This is going to
be a real challenge.
We'll start next class with assessing the similarities and
differences between the Scotch criminal procedure rules and our own.
We'll then put that information aside for the moment, and analyze the
robbery hypo within our American system. Then we'll analyze the
exact same hypo, this time by adopting some of the Scotch procedural
rules. Are there strategies we will have to abandon altogether, or
must we merely look for an alternative strategic paths? On the other
hand, do our new procedural rules provide us with opportunities we
did not have under the American rules? This will be fun. It will also
be difficult, and require sophisticated strategic fluidness.
III. TRIAL ADVOCACY EXERCISES-TEACHING
NOTES & LESSON: PLAN FOR CENTERING ON
STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING WITH A "GLOBAL"
FLAVOR
Description: This exercise has four (4) parts if you choose to do
the full exercise. The instructor may, however, shorten the exercise
by choosing parts 1, 2, and 3 or 4. Part 1 is a quick introduction to
unique features of the Scottish legal system. Part 2 asks students to
consider alternative case theories to a robbery defense, within the
current American system, and to make strategic decisions including
the content of specific skills performances (e.g., voir dire, opening
statement), based on their case theory decisions. In parts 3 and 4, the
students replace familiar aspects of the American criminal procedure
system with those of the Scottish system (e.g., in Scotland, there is no
jury voir dire), and repeat the strategic analysis from Part 1.
Purpose: To force the students to refine their trial strategies and
skills performances in light of different (i.e., Scottish) criminal
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procedure rules, thereby sharpening their strategic skills and making
explicit the relationship between legal procedure and the available
range of trial strategies. Secondarily, the exercises show the students
that other approaches to conducting a criminal trial than our own are
possible.
Readings: A good summary of Scottish Criminal Procedure is
offered in Peter Duff s, "The Scottish Criminal Jury: A Very Peculiar
Institution. ' '39 If the instructor is uncomfortable with a summary, they
can have their library borrow a copy of Robert Wemyss Renton and
Henry Hilton Brown's, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACCORDING TO THE
LAW OF SCOTTLAND.
40
PART 1: INTRODUCING THE SCOTTISH CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE SYSTEM
While a common-law system, the Scotch criminal procedure
system differs from our own in a number of significant respects (e.g.,
no voir dire or peremptory challenges, no opening statement).
Depending on the time the instructor chooses to commit to this
portion of the exercise, the instructor can; (1) provide the students
with a list or chart noting the differences from our system, or (2) have
the students bring forth and discuss the differences.
A. Summary of unique aspects of Scottish Criminal Procedure:
Both the United States and Scotland are common-law systems in
which the criminal defendant is presumed innocent,41 the prosecution
must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,4 2 and the defendant has
a privilege against self-incrimination," a right to cross-examination,"
"See Duff supra note 36.
40 ROBERT WEMYSS RENTON AND HENRY HILTON BROWN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF SCOTLAND, § 24-01 at 423 (Gerald H. Gordon ed.,
Green & Son 1996) (6th ed. 1996).
41 See id.
42 id.
431d. § 12-27 at 175 (explaining that accused is not required to answer questions or
make statement during procedure to determine if there is a prima facie case to hold
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and a right to counsel.45 Nevertheless, there are significant procedural
differences between the two systems. In contrast to the United States,
the defendant has no right to a jury trial in Scotland.46 In cases tried
by jury, jurors are chosen by lots; 47 there is no voir dire,48 no
peremptory challenges, 49 and challenges for cause are so rare that
there is no formal procedure for making such a challenge.5 ° The
Court keeps stringent control over the media regarding providing
information potentially affecting the jury panel,5' without any
countervailing American-like constitutional right to speech or
information.52 There are no opening statements,53 the jury is read the
indictment, which contains a narrative of the prosecutors' cases 4 and,
at the end of evidence, the jury only hears brief comments55 by the
accused for trial). See also, id. § 24-10 at 427 (explaining that the accused is "a
competent witness for defense", but may only be called for the defense "on his own
application."); Id. § 24-12 at 428 (explaining that defendant does not have to testify;
but judge can comment on failure "to give evidence").
4Id. § 18-48 at 244.
4sId. § 12-11 at 170, § 12-41 at 180.
'See Duff, supra note 36, at 177 (explaining that when a case may be tried under
law by either a judge or jury, as in the case with robbery, it is the prosecutor who
chooses the form of fact finders).
471Id. at 180.
48 id.
49 Id. at 182-85. ("In Scotland, the right of peremptory challenge has gradually
disappeared. The position was formalized in the early nineteenth century when the
accused was granted five peremptory challenges, but the number was reduced to
three in 1980, and abolished altogether in 1995.").
5 ld. at 181.
5  Id. at 185-6 (illustrating the scope with which this power is utilized by a case in
which the trial court barred airing of a documentary television program, in part
about a doctor who was also to be a witness at the trial. While the program had
absolutely nothing to do with the subject of the trial, because it gave the impression
that the doctor was a person of great character, the court felt it could unfairly
influence the jury).
52Id. at 187 ("It should be remembered that, unlike in the United States, in Scotland
there is no constitutional right to freedom of expression or freedom of information




55 Id. at 190.
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prosecution and defense. Since medieval times, thejury has consisted
of fifteen persons," with a bare eight-to-seven majority57 to reach a
verdict. There are no alternates,5" and no hung juries.59 Trial rarely
takes more than a few days.' One pro-defense feature not found in
United States criminal jurisprudence is that in Scotland, prosecution
eye-witnesses must have corroboration.61 That means that a
defendant may not be convicted solely on the testimony of even a
completely credible eye-witness. 62 And then there is the so-called
"Scotch verdict;" guilty, not guilty, "not proven." Actually, in
America, we effectively have "guilty" and "not proven, '63 because
our "not guilty" verdict is not an affirmative statement of the defen-
dant's innocence;' but rather, that the prosecution has failed to carry
its constitutionally mandated burden of proving every element of the
crime "beyond a reasonable doubt., 65 In fact, there has been some
suggestion by American academics to add a third verdict of
"innocence" to our own system,66 both to avoid the stigma67 that that
56 Id. at 187.
5 d.at 188.
58 1d. at 188-89.
59 1d. (explaining that if jurors get ill, the case still goes on. The system can accept
losing up to three jurors. A majority vote of eight is then needed for a conviction,
with anything less constituting an acquittal).
6°d. at 189.
6 1 d. at 192-94.
62 On its face, the law of Scotland requires "at least two witnesses implicating the
accused...." Renton and Brown, supra note, at §24-69 at 461. But, in fact, the rule
"does not require every circumstance be proved by two witnesses." Id. Rather the
prosecution must present "at least two sources" of evidence for the essential
elements . Id. Of course, two consistent eye-witnesses would satisfy this rule. Id.
63 See Bray, supra note 36.
6 See Bray, supra note 36, at 1308 ("acquittal covers some who are [factually]
guilty and some who are [factually] innocent ....").
65 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314-20 (1979).
'See, e.g., Barbato, supra note 36, at 543-47; Andrew D. Liepold, The Problem of
the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1297, 1300 (2000); Samuel
Bray, supra note 36, at 1303, n. 29. (Cal. Penal Code § 851.8 (West 1985 & Supp.
2005). This finding is available to any defendant whose charges have been dropped
or who has been acquitted at trial. The finding may be made by the judge upon a
determination "that no reasonable cause exists to believe that the arrestee committed
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remains over the defendant even after an acquittal, and to provide
future employers more accurate "market information."68
Interestingly, there have been fairly recent movements in Scotland to
eliminate the "not proven" verdict69 because "[i]t simply creates the
odd phenomenon of qualified innocence, which carries a stigma...
or qualified guilt, which carries no penalty."7 °
PART 2: CASE STRATEGY IN THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM-ALIBI VS. "REASONABLE DOUBT" DEFENSE
In this exercise, the students are defense attorneys strategically
approaching the defense of a robbery charge. As an option, skills
exercises tying strategic decisions to voir dire and opening statement
are included.
The robbery hypothetical Ed Sam has been charged with robbing
at gunpoint the attendant at Day 'n Night Cleaners. The sole eye-
witness, an employee and victim, while "very shaken" when talking
the offense for which the arrest was made."); See also Liepold, supra note 64, at
1324-1325. Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication,
57 U. CHI. L. REv. 729, 766-67 (1990). Other suggestions for "third verdicts"
include "no blame" acquittal (jury disapproved of conduct) with "no violation" (did
nothing legally wrong). Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic
Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 199, 290 (1982) and "guilty, but not punishable"
(acquitted for no exculpatory public policy defense, such as police overreaching).
67See e.g., Bray supra note 36, at 1300 ("With a high standard of proof, such as
beyond a reasonable doubt, the public will know that some defendants are being
acquitted because of insufficient evidence, not factual innocence"). See also Bray
supra note 36, at 1320.
68Bray, supra note 37, at 1307-08.
69 See Barbato, supra note 37, at 557-58.
70 Barbato, supra note 36, at 563 (quoting John Home Robertson, Member of
Parliament for East Lothian). Unlike Americans, the Scotch, therefore, do not seem
to perceive the "not proven" or "reasonable doubt" acquittal as a mechanism that
provides part of a screening system which serves to protect us from overreaching
executive power. Compare, John Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense
Attorney - New Answers for Old Questions 32 STAN. L. REv. 295, 296 at seq.
(1980), with Duff, supra note 36, at 195 (explaining that there is some anecdotal
evidence that the "not proven" verdict has been employed by Scotch juries as a
means for "jury nullification" (i.e., conscious rejection of the law)).
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to police that night, was able to give the police a description of the
robber (5'11," 185 lbs., early twenties Caucasian, male, short brown
hair, red jacket). Defendant was selected by the victim in a lineup in
which the eyewitness told police, "#3 [the defendant] looks like the
guy who robbed me." Ed Sam is twenty-seven years old, Caucasian,
5'11", 185 lbs., short brown hair, a small "soul patch" goatee and,
when arrested was wearing a red jacket with a thin white stripe along
each sleeve. Other than the jacket, the government does not have any
physical or forensic evidence.
Ed has told his attorney the following: As a kid, he grew up in a
rough neighborhood and was always getting in trouble. He dropped out
of school at sixteen, amassing a juvenile record including petty thefts,
fights, and a car theft, for which he spent a year in juvenile detention.
A drunken fight on his twenty-first birthday led to a month in county
jail, and to a decision to get his life on track. Ed first got his general
education degree (GED), went on to community college where he
graduated with honors, and is currently the manager of a very
successful grocery shopping service. He is engaged to a woman he met
in community college (who is the administrative assistant to the head
of a small software company), and plans to be married in the fall.
At the time of the robbery, Ed was playing cards with four friends.
All claim that, but for "about fifteen minutes" when Ed went to get
beer, he was with them all night. Two of Ed's friends have criminal
convictions for theft crimes which would be admissible in the juris-
diction for impeachment. Also, the Day 'n Night Cleaners is a five
to seven minute drive from the house where Ed was playing cards.
Class Questions
(1) What is your Case Theory?7
The legal theory is a reasonable doubt concerning the element of
identity. The factual theory is misidentification (witness was "very
71 MARILYN J. BERGER, ET AL.,TRIAL ADvOCACY: PLANNING, ANALYSIs, AND
STRATEGY 16-17 (1989) ("Case Theory" is a term denoting the advocates basic trial
strategy).
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shaken," does not mention facial hair, defendant is twenty-seven-
years-old, not early 20s. The Witness does not mention "thin white
strip" on jacket sleeve and did not say at line up "that's the man"
instead said it "looks like the man"). While an alibi defense would
include attacking the reliability of the ID, one could focus solely on
misidentification without raising alibi.
(2) If you're going to attack the ID anyway, what's the
harm in throwing in the alibi?
A misidentification defense lets you raise a pure "reasonable
doubt defense";72 so, attack the prosecution case on cross-
examination, do not call on any defense witnesses, force the prosecu-
tion to explain its own case rather than shift to the credibility of the
defense witness, and focus the jury on weaknesses of the prosecution
case. Of course, technically an alibi is not a true affinrative defense,
i.e., the burden on ID remains on the prosecution. So, in theory a
juror could think, "I don't have a great deal of confidence in the alibi,
but it's enough to raise a reasonable doubt in my mind." But as a
practical matter, it would seem that if you put an alibi on, and the jury
does not buy it, conviction is likely to follow. Additionally, in this
case there appears to be some problems with the alibi: (1) Two of the
witnesses have criminal records, and (2) there might have been time
for Ed to leave the card game, and rob the cleaners, and return within
"about fifteen minutes" (which could be twenty to twenty-five
minutes when you're playing cards with friends and drinking).
Whether these problems will turn out to be serious will depend. If
either or both of the other two friends, who do not have convictions,
make good witnesses, the convictions are a non-issue. As to the time,
to the extent the need for Ed to go out to get beer mid-game was not
easily anticipated, so he would not have thought to have some stashed
72The Case Theory in turn is composed of two interrelated components-a "Legal
Theory" (generally the elements of a cause of action or defense, Berger supra note
69, at 17-22), and a "Factual Theory" (the party's basic "story"). Berger supra note
69, at 22-23. Under this conception, opening, cross-x, voir dire, and such are not
fragmented, atomized performances; but rather all opportunities to carry forth the
"Case Theory." Berger supra note 69, at 26-27.
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in his car for his alibi and the beer he brought back was cold and he
had no obvious means to have kept it chilled in his car, the timing
becomes less of a problem.
(3) How should you advise Ed about taking or
not taking the stand?
Initially, there is the concern that by taking the stand, for practical
purposes, the defendant has diminished the power of a reasonable
doubt defense in which the burden is totally on the prosecution. Once
the defendant takes the stand, however, the case is likely to rise and
fall on whether the jury believes the defendant, with the prosecution's
closing focusing heavily on her cross of the defendant. Further, in
this case, if the defendant takes the stand, he will also have to put on
alibi witnesses, since it is difficult conceiving the jury accepting the
defendant's story that he was with four friends if none of those
friends are called to the stand to confirm his story. On the other hand,
at least initially, it seems that the defendant has a powerful story to
tell of a "life redeemed" which will likely make the potential tragedy
of a wrongful conviction weigh very heavily on the jurors in deciding
the case. Also, his story is in effect a legitimate form of character
evidence "Look who he is. Look at what he's overcome. Look at the
life he has now, the person he has become. How can you imagine the
person he is today picking up a gun, pointing the gun in the face of a
teenaged attendant and grabbing $197.00?"
(4) How will your strategic choices affect your voir dire?
This portion of the exercise can be limited to class strategizing,
or include an actual performance component where students conduct
portions of the voir dire. Whatever overall strategy the defense
chooses (alibi, with or without defendant's testimony; pure reason-
able doubt case; etc.), a core portion of the defense will be mis-
identification.
The juror's view toward eye-witness identifications therefore
must be explored. Do you believe people ever make mistakes
identifying someone in court? Has anyone come up to you in the past
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few months thinking they knew you when, in fact, they were a
complete stranger? Tell me about that. Have you ever thought you
knew someone, but it turned out that you were wrong? Tell me about
that. Why do you think that happened?
Whether you put on a pure reasonable doubt defense or the alibi
without defendant, you also have to voir dire on the defendant not
taking the stand. If you were accused of doing something wrong and
you were innocent, wouldn't you want to tell your side of the story?
How will you feel then if my client does not take the stand? You
know that under our Constitution a defendant does not have to take
the stand in a criminal case? Do you agree with that? Why? Can you
think why an innocent defendant would not take the stand?
If you are going to put on an alibi, you probably want to voir dire
about alibi, too. If I said a defendant has an "alibi" what image comes
to mind? Some people might say that if the alibi isn't "perfect",
they'll ignore it. How do you feel about that? What kind of witnesses
would you expect in an alibi? Would you be surprised if the witnesses
were friends of the defendant?
Finally, as an overall strategy, you may decide that you are going
to try to hang the jury, rather than try for an acquittal.73 Therefore,
e.g., you may decide to try a pure reasonable doubt case, thereby
providing no record of a defense case for subsequent prosecutors if
the jury hangs and the case in retried (though, under this strategy, the
hope is to sufficiently hang the jury (seven-to-five; eight to-four) that
the prosecution will not seek a retrial), and in jury selection chose
strong individuals who you believe will disagree and hold to their
positions.
(5) How will your strategic choices affect your opening statement?
The defense always has the option of waiving or reserving the
opening statement (until the defense case). There are a number of
reasons why the defense might choose not to give an opening
statement.74 The defense may not want to tell the prosecution
73 BERGER ET AL, supra note 69, at 168.
74BERGER ET AL, supra note 69, at 208.
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whether or not the defendant will testify, may not want to pin itself
down to putting on the defendant (or even a case) before hearing the
prosecution's case, and/or may not want to set the jury up for
expectations which might not be met. (On the other hand, there is a
risk that if the defense does not give an opening, the jurors will
prematurely resolve the case into a narrative antithetical to the
defense.)75 Reserving the opening can serve several functions. It
71 See LANCE BENNE & MARTHA FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTION REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM (1981) (While a good voir dire and cross examination may go some
way towards exposing the jury to the defense case theory, nevertheless, there are
risks if you do not get your story in front of the jury before their own "story" of the
case hardens during the prosecution case. Placing presented evidence into stories
(i.e., narratives) is at the core of the juror's decision-making process). Nancy
Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The
Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 519, 520 (1991) (As Bennett and Feldman
found, narrative allows jurors to make sense of the trial. Opening statements aside,
trials are often fragmented affairs in which evidence comes in a piece at a time,
often without any deference to logical order, and at times consisting of extensive
evidentiary foundations which are unrelated to the substance of the case. Jurors
make sense of this by constantly trying to fit the information they are hearing into
a story. Narrative also guides the jurors to their ultimate decision, as they look at
the stories being presented and assess whether the stories "made sense" in terms of
logic, common sense, their own experiences, their cultural biases and beliefs, and
their own stories about how people do or do not behave in the situations raised in
the trial. The recent study by Penning and Hastie confirms that Bennett and
Feldman thesis). Id. at 519-20 (according to this later study, jurors do not make
their decisions using mathematical models, Bayesian or otherwise). Id. at 520
(explaining that they decide by what Penning and Hastie call the "story model."
Like Bennett and Feldman, these researchers conclude that jurors order the
information at trial into story representations and then compare their own stories to
those offered by the parties in deciding the case outcome). Id. at 521 (explaining
their central finding was that the story,which the individual juror constructs,will
determine the decision that a particular juror reaches). See also Id. at 525. (and
again, these stories will be constructed from case specific information mixed in with
the juror's unique knowledge and beliefs about the world and those in it. In other
words, the juror's socially constructed reality. "Because all jurors hear the same
evidence and have the same general knowledge about expected structures of stories,
differences in story construction must arise from differences in world knowledge;
that is, differences in experiences and beliefs about the social world.") Id. at 525
(emphasis added).
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gives the defense the choice of waiting until after the prosecution's
case to decide whether to put on a case, can serve as a bluff in cases
when the defense never intends to put on a case, and in those cases
when the defense does put on witnesses, the reserved opening can
focus the jurors on the upcoming defense witnesses.
In our case, the decision whether and when to give an opening,
and the content if you do, is driven by the results of the previous
strategic choices. If you are doing the pure reasonable doubt case, you
might decide to reserve the opening and then rest when it comes time
for your case. Or, you might decide to give an opening highlighting
some of the major problems with the ID, pointing out that "the
government will not offer any real physical (other than the jacket) or
forensic evidence," and conclude with a statement that at the end of
the testimony you will come back on closing and ask for an acquittal
because "the government has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that they have the right person."
If, on the other hand, the defendant is going to testify, you can
frame your opening around who the defendant is (i.e., tell his story),
where he was that night, about his being arrested and placed in a line-
up, and then discuss problems with the ID. If defendant is not going
to testify but still raise an alibi, you will not be able to tell his full
personal story (although some of it may come in through one of his
alibi witnesses), and will likely try in your opening to connect the
alibi with the overall problem of misidentification.
PART 3: SAME HYPOTHETICAL; DIFFERENT SYSTEM
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In this portion of the exercise, we take a second look at our
hypothetical, but, for this round we imagine that we are working in
American courts, but have incorporated all the variants of Scottish
criminal procedure listed in Part 1, except for the "Scotch verdict".
We'll use that unique feature of the Scottish system in Part 4.
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(1) Which strategies we've discussed in Part 2 are either
unavailable, or significantly curtailed under the Scottish criminal
procedural rules?76
Looking back at our strategic choices in Part 2, under the Scottish
rules: (1) it is impossible to hang ajury,7 therefore, that basic defense
strategy in our own system is null and void under the Scotch rules; (2)
we will not have either an opening or voir dire;78 therefore, we will
not have either of those avenues for educating the jury about our
chosen theory, while the prosecution's "narrative" will be contained
in the indictment and read to the jury at the beginning of trial.
(2) Can you compensate for any of these limitations on the
strategies from Part 2? How?
You don't have either an opening or voir dire to get across your
theory; but you do have some strategic options: (1) If possible,
explicitly structure your cross-examination to give the jury a good
sense of your theory; (2) ask the court to give you an instruction at the
beginning of trial (and perhaps sometime in the prosecution's case)
to the effect that the defense has not had an opportunity to explain its
version of the case to the jury, that the burden of proof is completely
on the government, and that for the system to function the jurors must
wait until all evidence and arguments before they form an initial view
"Given the garden variety nature of this case, the strict control the Scottish Courts
exercise over the media (see supra note 68) is not significant; although, I have
strong personal reservations about "trying cases in the media" under any
circumstances. Once my good friend J. Gerald Schwartzbach commenced his
representation of the actor Robert Blake (who was accused of murdering his wife),
the story dropped from the media-until the acquittal. See, Andrew Blankstein &
Jean Guccione, Actor Robert Blake Acquitted in Shooting Death of His Wife, Los
ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at A3. But see Robert S. Bennet, Press Advocacy
and the High Profile Client, 30 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 13, 13 (1996) (getting favorable
media is particularly important for a business or political leader who has built a
strong reputation for integrity and honesty).
77See Duff supra note 36, at 190.
78 See id. at 180, 189.
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of the case;79 (3) if, similar to most trials in Scotland, °8 it is a bench
trial, a well-crafted trial brief can effectively lay out the defense for
the fact finder.
(3) Are any strategic options available under the Scotch criminal
justice system that were not available under the American system?
How will that option effect your cross-examination?
Even with an unimpeachable eye-witness (which the witness in
this case certainly is not), Scottish rules require acquittal if the
testimony lacks corroboration."' Here, the fact that the robber and the
defendant both owned red jackets is the only corroboration for the
eye-witness. While even when raising a misidentification theory in
the American system, defense counsel would raise the lack of the
white stripe in the victim's description of the robber's jacket in cross
examination ("You described the jacket as red, didn't you? You never
mentioned seeing any other color on thejacket, did your?"); under the
Scotch system that attack on the only corroboration would be a major
part of the defense theory-no corroboration, no conviction:
" Cross examination of investigating officer
O Officer, you interviewed the victim right after the robbery?
o And he gave you a description of the robber?
o You asked him what the robber was wearing?
" Cross examination of victim
o Now you were only a few feet from the robber, weren't you?
o And he was holding a gun with his arm stretched out?
o So you could see his arm?
o Now when you talked to the police, you gave them a
description?
o And you tried to give the most complete description you
could?
79While this will not be completely effective given how jurors create stories, it may
serve as a reminder, particularly if given more than once.
80Duff, supra note 36, at 175-76.81See id. at 194.
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o Because you wanted to help the police catch this guy?
o And you knew that the more detailed and accurate your
description, the better chance the police would have of
catching him?
o So you described the robber's age? His' weight and height?
His hair color and hair style?
o And you described his clothing?
o You told the police that he was wearing a red jacket, didn't
you?
o Just red, right?
o You didn't see any other color on the jacket, did you?
o If you had, you'd have told the police?
0 You didn't see any white coloring against the red, did you?
o You didn't see any white stripes down the sleeves when the
robber extended his arm?
o You didn't see any white stripes at any time, did you?
Cross examination of arresting officer
o Now officer, when you arrested my client he was wearing the
jacket you've just introduced into evidence?
o And that jacket is red?
o But it has white stripes down both of the sleeves, doesn't it?
o And each of these stripes is at least /" wide?
o So, you had no trouble seeing them when you arrested the
defendant, did you?
[This is a slightly risky question which should probably not be asked
unless (a) you've interviewed the officer or (b) the stripes are so
obvious that any answer except no would appear disingenuous.]
PART 4: INCORPORATING ONLY THE
"SCOTCH VERDICT"
In this portion of the exercise, all aspects of the American system
remain as they are except we replace the guilty/not guilty verdict form
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with the three part (Scotch) verdict-guilty, not guilty (i.e., innocent),
not proven (i.e., reasonable no doubt).82
(1) How would this form of verdict affect your voir dire?
Here, the first guilty verdict is the result of the prosecution
carrying its burden. The third not proven verdict is the result of the
prosecution failing to carry its burden. The second not guilty verdict,
however, would be a burden the defense would have to carry. Part of
voir dire will be making certain that the jury appreciates that as to
"not proven," the defense has no burden. If I argue that my client is
innocent, and you are not convinced, will you automatically find him
guilty? Do you think you could say that I'm not convinced the
defendant is innocent, but I still have a doubt as to his guilt? Does it
make sense to you to not find him innocent and not find him guilty?
Also, if you don't plan to argue for not guilty/innocent (for
reasons discussed below), analogous to the possible juror belief that
an innocent defendant would take the stand, some jurors may believe
that an innocent person would seek a not guilty/innocent verdict. If
you were charged with a crime of which you were innocent, would
you seek a verdict of innocent? If my client seeks only "not proven",
what will you think? Will you tend to think that he is probably guilty?
Can you think of any reason that an innocent defendant would only
seek a "not proven" verdict?
82See Liepold supra note 64, at 1315. The proposals for bringing a "third verdict"
into American jurisprudence did not envision that all three be considered at once;
rather, the not guilty/innocent determination would be made by the jury only after
an acquittal; see also Bray, supra note 36, at 1305. Interestingly, even in Scotland
the judges tend not to instruct the jury how to apply the three verdicts. See Duff,
supra note 37, at 193. ("[Tlhe [Scottish] Court of Appeal has discouraged judges
from attempting to direct jurors as to the difference between not proven and not
guilty, although they must be informed of three verdicts available to them.").
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(2) How would this from of verdict affect your decision about
whether to put the defendant or the alibi witnesses on the stand?
While in theory it may be possible to imagine such an
overwhelming amalgam of reasonable doubt that it transposes into
innocence, as a realistic matter, the jury in this case would have to
hear at least the alibi witnesses to come to a verdict of not guilty/
innocent. Plainly, defendant's compelling story (i.e., why would he
do this given his life?) would be a powerful addition to the mix.
(Note: An interesting counseling exercise could be built around a
client who initially insists on seeking a verdict of not guilty/innocent
when his testimony and/or that of his witnesses carry serious risks if
presented; while, at the same time, the defense has a very strong
reasonable doubt (i.e., "not proven" case if no defense witnesses are
offered.)
(3) How would this form of verdict affect your
opening and closing?
If you are seeking a "not proven" verdict, your decisions
concerning your opening do not differ from the strategic choices in
Part 2 (although, you may wish to make clear from the outset that you
are not seeking not guilty/innocent). If you are seeking a not
guilty/innocent verdict (with "not proven" as a safety net), the matter
is otherwise. First, you probably have to give an opening. Second,
while the theme of misidentification will appear, your emphasis will
be an affirmative innocence (i.e., your client's personal story of
"overcoming and succeeding", and the alibi).
While from my experience, some defense attorneys feel that they
must argue in closing that their client is innocent, they do so at the
price of taking on a burden in a system where all burdens are on the
prosecution. Claiming not guilty/innocent, however, is a form of
affirmative defense where the burden (at least realistically) rests on
the defense. How do you do that while maintaining the "not proven"
option? Perhaps, defense counsel could begin closing, e.g., "Not only
does the evidence mandate a verdict of 'not proven', under the
evidence before you, you should find my client 'not guilty/innocent'.
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Let me first list all the reasons the prosecution has failed to meet its
extremely high burden of proof; then I will focus on the evidence
from which my client's innocence of this robbery is clear.... .
IV. CONCLUSION
Awareness of law beyond the borders of our nation is one
"fashionable" topic which is destined to remain with us. My
expressed goal in this article was to use the criminal procedure of a
foreign nation as a pedagogical tool for creating some very
challenging exercises to improve strategic aspects of the students'
domestic advocacy skills. At the same time, it is plain that such a use
of foreign law carries other, secondary benefits. If nothing else, it can
spice up the pedagogy, and that is hardly something to be taken
lightly. Also, in the manner of a liberal arts education, exercises such
as these add to the students' general knowledge of the world. These
types of exercises also offer an antidote to our tendency towards
American-centered provincialism. Beyond being told about another
version of our common-law system, you get an additional level of
appreciation when you actually attempt to use the aspects of that
system that differ from our own. Come to think of it, as fashions go
this may not prove to be a bad one.
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